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Articles
Marxism and The Rule of Law
MICHAEL MANDEL*
The revival of interest in Marxist legal analysis has prompted a
reconsideration of the function of the concept of the rule of law.
Appreciation of the rule of law as an instrument of legitimation of
the economic and political order has assumed particular
significance in Canada due to the recent enactment of the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms. In this article the author examines
the two aspects in which the rule of law may be said to exist - the
democratic and the juridical - and through the application of
Marxist analysis to several recent political events demonstrates the
relationship of the rule of law to developments in the politico-legal
system characteristic of late capitalism.
Le regain dintiret pour l'analyse juridique marxiste a suscite un
rexamen de la fonction du principe de la prddminence du droit qui,
comme instrument de ldgitimisation de l'ordre dconomique et
politique en place, revet une importance toute particuliere depuis
l'adoption de la Charte canadienne des droits et libert~s. Dans l'ar-
ticle qui suit, l'auteur 6tudie les deux aspects - democratique et
juridique - sous lesquels le principe de la prddminence du droit est
habituellement prdsentd et ddmontre, par l'application de I'analyse
marxisted une sdrie d'evenements politiques rdcents, la relation en-
tre ce principe et l'dvolution politico-juridique du systeme
capitaliste avancd.
*Associate Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University. The author wishes to thank L.H. LaRue for
the inspiration of his work on legal rhetoric and also for his careful reading and helpful comments on an earlier
version of this manuscript. Similar thanks are due to Harry Glasbeek and Leo Panitch and to Maggie Stockton
for her help in preparing the manuscript.
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CLASSICAL MARXISM AND LAW
Classical Marxism was at its unsentimental best when it came to law.
When dealing in their writings with legality, Marx and Engels sought to
discredit completely any notion of an autonomous or egalitarian legal realm
capable of transcending or resolving the discord, unfulfillment and subjuga-
tion of everyday life or (most importantly) of restraining the oppressive social
power of class society. This attitude can be found with remarkable consistency
whether one consults the earlier or the later works, and is equally evident in
theoretical and agitational writing. For example, in On the Jewish Question,
an early theoretical work concerned with "freedom of religion", Marx criticized
the various French and American 18th-century bourgeois-revolutionary
declarations of the "Rights of Man", including "equality before the law", as
"the freedom ... of a man treated as an isolated monad and withdrawn into
himself".' Although this "political emancipation" which banished religion
"from the field of public law" constituted "a great progress", it was a very far
cry from "real emancipation":
But we should not be deceived about the limitations of political emancipation. The
separation of man into a public and private man, the displacement of religion from
the state to civil society is not a stage but the completion of political emancipation,
which thus does not abolish or even try to abolish the actual religiosity of man.2
In The German Ideology, written a few years later with Engels, law is
assimilated to religion: "It must not be forgotten that law has just as little in-
dependent history as religion". It is a "juridical illusion which reduces law to
mere will"': that is, which treats it as independent of the real relationships of
people. The state in its "independence" is an "illusory communal life" and
the struggles within it "nothing but the illusory forms in which the real strug-
gles of different classes are carried out among one another". 4 In The Com-
munist Manifesto bourgeois jurisprudence is labelled: "but the will of your
class made into a law for all, a will whose essential character and direction are
determined by the economical conditions of existence of your class".'
Marx's mature works do not substantially depart from these formula-
tions. Rather, the ideas are deepened and given more precision. The classic
statement is in the Preface to A Critique of Political Economy, where Marx
employs the architectural metaphor of "base" and "superstructure". It was
from studying law, Marx says, that he found that "legal relations as well as
forms of state are to be grasped neither from themselves nor from the so-called
general development of the human mind, but rather have their roots in the
material conditions of life". The "real foundation" of society is "[tihe sum
total of [its] relations of production ... on which arises a legal and political
superstructure". Property relations are "but a legal expression" for the "ex-
'K. Marx, Karl Marx Selected Writings, D. McLellan (ed.) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977) 53.
2
1bid., at 47.
3K. Marx and F. Engels, Writings of the Young Marx on Philosophy and Society, L.D. Easton and K.H. Guddat
(trans. and ed.) (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Company Inc., 1967) 471.
4
1bid., at 425.
'Supra, footnote I at 234.
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isting relations of production". Law is, like politics, religion, aesthetics and
philosophy, an "ideological form" in which we "become conscious of the
[productive relations] conflict and fight it out".
6
When he published Capital (Volume I) eight years later, Marx both reaf-
firmed his adherence to the base/superstructure metaphor 7 , and elaborated it
on two fronts. Toward the end of the book, the chapters on "The Expropria-
tion of the Agricultural Population from the Land" and "Bloody Legislation
Against the Expropriated", detail the role of law in the "blood and fire" of
"so-called primitive accumulation".' A more complicated theory of law in-
forms the earlier parts of the book where juridical relations are assimilated to
and rooted in the deceptive "fetishistic" form of commodity exchange, which
mystifies the actual social relations of domination and dependence which
underlie it. The "juridical relation, whose form is the contract ... mirrors the
economic relation", 9 and when applied to the wage contract is the basis of "all
the notions of justice held by both the worker and the capitalist""' . The
mystification lies in the contrast between the "equality before the law" of the
"sphere of circulation" and the unequal relation of capitalist and "his
worker", which prevails in the "hidden abode of production"."
Finally, to conclude this brief tour of Marx's attitude toward law, in the
Critique of the Gotha Programme written in the last decade of his life, we find
the following critique of the notion of a "fair distribution of the proceeds of
labour":
Do not the bourgeois assert that the present-day distribution is 'fair'? And is it not,
in fact, the only 'fair' distribution on the basis of the present-day mode of produc-
tion? Are economic relations regulated by legal conceptions or do not, on the con-
trary, legal relations arise from economic ones? Have not also the socialist sectarians
the most varied notions about 'fair' distribution?'
In the same document Marx wrote: "Right can never be higher than the
economic structure of society and its cultural development conditioned
thereby". In fact, he went even farther: "Equal right is ... constantly [and here
Marx meant to include even the first stage of communism] stigmatized by a
bourgeois limitation. It is ... a right of inequality, in its content, like every
right."I
'Ibid., at 330.
'K. Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy Volume No. 1, B. Fowkes (trans.) (Hardmondsworth:




''Ibid., at 279-80 (emphasis added).
2Supra, footnote I at 566.
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MODERN DEVELOPMENTS IN MARXIST LEGAL THEORY
So, far from an autonomous, egalitarian sphere, the legal realm for
classical Marxism was rooted in the social relations of production whose op-
pressiveness it not only did not counteract, relieve or even escape, but rather
ratified, mystified and enhanced. This theme has been carried on in the work
of modern Marxist legal theorists with often brilliant results. One of the most
significant developments was the attempt in the 1920s by Soviet theorist E.B.
Pashukanis to develop a Marxist theory of law along the lines of Marx's treat-
ment of the fetishism of the commodity in Volume I of Capital. Pashukanis'
theory has been much maligned and misunderstood;" it does contain some
major flaws (mostly having to do with its neglect of the sphere of production),
but it made a great contribution in elucidating the specifically bourgeois and
historical character of certain basic juridical categories. The most important of
these is the "legal subject" endowed with precisely that amount of free will
necessary to deny for purposes of ratification in the legal realm the unequal
and compulsory nature of the relations of production. Pashukanis made an
important distinction, not often recognized in commentary on his work, be-
tween law on the one hand and other types of social rules and political norms
on the other, precisely on the basis of this defining feature of the legal
subject." He was thus able to give meaning to the notion of the "withering
away of law". Whatever the merits of this distinction for his specific purpose,
it is of enormous significance, as we shall see, in understanding the current
controversy surrounding the notion of the rule of law.
The revival of interest in Pashukanis' theory in the late 1970s, which involved
a retranslation of his major works and many review articles, was part of a
Marxist legal renaissance. I will mention only three major developments. First,
there is the vigorous and compelling defence by G.A. Cohen,'" on a
sophisticated functionalist basis, of the base/superstructure metaphor itself
and of law's superstructural character. Cohen's work has cleared up many of
the major misconceptions surrounding the claim that law is superstructural,
including the objection that this claim renders law irrelevant. In contrast,
Cohen argues that "bases need superstructures, and they get the superstruc-
tures they need because they need them"." That is, capitalist relations need
the law and that is why the law exists and takes the form it does. Though
Cohen does not seriously address the precise mechanism by which law protects
relations of production ("might without right may be impossible, inefficient
or unstable"),' 8 others have stressed the normative aspect of law in
'4See, for example, C. Sumner's articles: "Pashukanis and the 'Jurisprudence of Terror' " (1981), 10 Insurgent
Sociologist 99; and "Law and Civil Rights in Marxist Theory" (1981), 9 Kapitalistate 63.
"E.B. Pashukanis, Law and Marxism: A General Theory, Barbara Einhorn (trans.) (London: Ink Links
Limited, 1978) 79, 124, 137, 177, 179, 184, 187, 188.
S
6G.A. Cohen, Karl Marx's Theory of History: A Defence (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978); and
G.A. Cohen, "Forces and Relations of Production" in B. Matthews (ed.) Marx: A Hundred Years On (London:
Lawrence and Wishart, 1983).
"Ibid., Karl Marx's Theory of History: A Defence at 233 (emphasis added).
"'Ibid.. at 231.
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"legitimating" oppressive relations - the second development I want to men-
tion.
A good example of this sort of work is that of Peter Gabel who has ex-
plained the changing nature of the dominant forms of legal philosophy (from
the positivism of H.L.A. Hart to the neo-natural law theory of Ronald
Dworkin)' 9 and of contract law (from freedom of contract to unconscionabili-
ty)20 on the basis of the changing nature of capitalist social relations
themselves which consequently need new sorts of legitimations. So "legal
positivism appears as a legitimating paradigm which romanticizes the func-
tional requirements of free market capitalism" and neo-natural law provides
"a legal paradigm that justifies regulatory interventions by government of-
ficials and co-operative or 'moral' behaviour between litigants". 2 ' In each
case, jurisprudence "manages only to transpose the objective requirements of
the existing social system into a normative legal order"., " And similarly, the
change in contract law does not occur "because a new and more equitable style
of legal reasoning has somehow sprung into being through a progressive
maturation of the judicial mind"." Instead, "at each stage in our history the
ideological imagery of contract law served to legitimate an oppressive socio-
economic reality by denying its oppressive character and representing it in im-
aginary terms". ' Gabel's concern here is clearly with the analysis of fun-
damental changes in jurisprudential and judicial discourse over so-called
"hard cases"; but of course the less lofty (but more characteristic) activity of
ratifying as "legal" the violent enforcement of class relations through the ad-
ministration of criminal and civil sanctions in "easy" cases (which is, after all,
the every day activity of most courts and most lawyers) can be regarded as of
essentially the same character.
Some objections to the general notion of legitimacy, especially as it ap-
plies to legal institutions, have recently been raised by Hyde2" who argues that
there is no evidence or other reason to believe that either the form or content
of legal reasoning has any significant impact on what people think of or do
about the social order. Although neither this argument nor the evidence of-
fered by Hyde are very convincing, it is worth pausing to consider the implica-
tions of his position. Primarily, it would leave us completely unable to account
for the huge expenditures of effort and ingenuity over the millenia in the more
or less intricate ideological defence of legal decisions and the legal defence of
political practices and arrangements. The enormous and (for reasons we will
come to) increasing amount of attention that has been paid in political rhetoric
and in the mass media to what the courts and the legal profession do and how
19
P. Gabel, "Book Review of Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously" (1977), 91 Harv. L. R. 302.
20P. Gabel and J. Feinman, "Contract Law as Ideology" in D. Kairys (ed.), The Politics of Law: A Progressive
Critique (New York: Random House, 1982).
2
1
Supra, footnote 19 at 309.
22
1bid., at 315.
23Supra, footnote 20 at 178.
24
Ibid., at 181.
25A. Hyde, "The Concept of Legitimation in the sociology of Law" (1983), 1-3 Wisconsin L.R. 379.
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they defend what they do would have been completely without effect on mass
behaviour. Paradoxically, the truth of this proposition would not diminish the
explanatory power of the legitimacy paradigm which, however, would have to
be explained as a massive misunderstanding. Hyde appears to concede that
those who engage in the incessant legal debates, arguments and justifications
believe their words have some effect and that is why they engage in the
behavior. Arguments that no one is paying any attention do not touch the
claim that the form and content of this rhetoric is meant to present the en-
forcement of class relations in acceptably mystifying terms. However, we
would still be left with a very odd result.
In fact, there is little plausibility to the position advanced by Hyde. In the
first place it depends on a very narrow notion of "legitimacy" which excludes
all motives for behaviour or approval that are not purely concerned with
pedigree; that is, with the source of the practice or value said to be legitimated.
According to Hyde, rational reasons for compliance, such as fear of sanctions,
prudence or self-interest, do not involve legitimacy. Neither do habit or
custom. Since, according to Hyde, all action can be reduced to these matters,
legitimacy is irrelevant. Furthermore, most of the evidence for the lack of a
"legitimacy effect" is deduced from the low public salience of courts and their
decisions relative to other influences on public opinion.
This restrictive notion of legitimacy rests on a host of misconceptions
about the function of law and misses a large part of the role played by law in
the social order. First, it misunderstands the implications of the social nature
of law for the relevance of legitimacy. Legal sanctions, for instance, are dif-
ferent from a punch in the nose. When a driver stops at a stop sign out of fear
of the sanction, his or her fear depends on a whole pattern of activity
unintelligible except for the practice of legitimating state action by law. The
driver only needs to fear because of a prediction that he or she will suffer
punishment. In Canada, that means a prediction that the police will act in a
certain way and that what they do will be sanctioned by a court as "legal", ac-
cording to all the bewildering professional techniques which that entails. Hart
recognized this long ago when he emphasized the fact that law exists where the
officials accept the applicable social practice. 6 Secondly, it is impossible to
distinguish pedigree effects from matters of fear, rationality or habit. It is the
habit of having courts make judgments and the fact that nobody seems to ob-
ject to their right to do so that makes pedigree relevant. Their right to do so is
in turn tied up with other prudential reasons or with notions - for example,
"democracy" - for which prudential reasons can be offered: "preferable to
anarchy" or the "least worst form of government".
In fact, though, legal legitimation is not at all limited to matters of
pedigree. Nowadays, at least, the official talk of lawyers and judges also
makes a direct appeal to prudential matters or to various ideals which may be
prudential, conventional or a mixture of the two. For example, if justice is giv-
ing everyone his or her "due", an appeal to justice is an appeal to one's own
hopes, interests and fears about what one is going to get for oneself. In fact,
the ability to legitimize concrete state practices by reference to the various ac-
2' 6H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1961).
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cepted and popular ideals seems to be one of the main functions of courts.
Hyde considers this "probably true but hardly interesting". 27 His reasons are
not forthcoming, but it appears that he would only be satisfied if court
rhetoric had itself an observable, transforming effect on our ideals: When that
effect ranks below the effect of other institutions or matters, this counts for
him as evidence against any legitimating function of the courts whatsoever.
The problem with this whole approach is that it means one is forced to at-
tribute only negative significance to the obvious fact of life that courts and
other legal and political institutions rarely disagree about substantive matters
and almost never about jurisdictional questions. If, instead, we viewed legal
institutions as merely one segment of a whole set of arrangements depending
for their effectiveness on co-ordination and consensus, that is, as an integrated
system developed by "trial and error ... over many generations", 28 we could
understand that "effectiveness" could co-exist with low "salience". I do not
mean that each segment of the arrangement should be viewed as merely adding
its own voice to a chorus singing in unison. Harmony is a more appropriate
metaphor, with each institution having its own distinct part, its own form of
legitimation, which is, in turn, recognized by the others. We should think, in
other words, in terms of a division of rhetorical labour. When the government
avoids a course of action by saying it is a matter for the courts or vice versa, it
is not helpful to ask which institution is more important. Rather we should ask
what ideals this form of rhetoric is seeking to evoke. It is even possible to iden-
tify, as we shall see, the ascendancy of one form over another at certain
periods.
The third theme I want to mention in recent Marxist legal theory can be
seen partly as a response to these qualms about legitimacy, at least in so far as
mass legitimacy is concerned. This is the whole discourse on "discipline",
which though Marxist in origin comes to modern Marxist legal theory via the
powerful thought of (the now, sadly, late) Michel Foucault who applies it in
interpreting the origins of the modern penal system. In Discipline and Punish,
Foucault shows how the emergence of the bourgeois notion of the rule of law,
including equality before the law, was accompanied by a system of criminal
punishment quite different from the one which had gone before. While the old
system of spectacular corporal punishments, intended to obliterate crime in a
demonstration of superior military strength, was consistent with the pre-
bourgeois bases of political power, the new penal system had a different pur-
pose geared to new democratic forms of political power. According to
Foucault, modern penal systems are not intended to eliminate crime but rather
to "distinguish", "distribute" and "use" it.29 Consequently, the apparently
egalitarian nature of punishment is subverted by dividing offenders into
"delinquents" (that is, "real criminals")" who are in need of discipline and
mere violators of laws who are not in need of discipline. In the same way
27Supra, footnote 25 at 415.
28
D. Hay, "Property, Authority and the Criminal Law" in D. Hay et aL, Albion 's Fatal Tree: Crime and Society
in Eighteenth Century England (London: Allen Lane, 1975) 53. This article has been badly misunderstood by
Hyde.
29M. Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (New York: Pantheon Books, 1977) 272.
"°Ibid., at 277.
19861
REVUE DE DROIT UN-B
modern political systems subvert (or "handle") democracy through discipline.
Legal popular sovereignty is rendered harmless and rulers keep control over
the masses, despite universal suffrage, through discipline. 3 ' The object of
discipline is ultimately the integration of subordinates into their subordinate
places. Its central mechanism is surveillance which is the precise word Foucault
uses in French for the title of his book ("Surveiller et Punir").
Foucault's work is only implicitly related to issues of class, or, rather,
class is for him only one aspect of the abstract "power of normalization".
2
On the other hand, Melossi and Pavarini in their study of the origins of the
penitentiary, The Prison and The Factory, draw an explicitly Marxist connec-
tion between Foucault's discussion of discipline and the notion of the two
spheres found in Marx's Capital. As the title suggests, the study notionally
locates the prison with the factory in the "hidden" sphere of production. The
prison, they show, was designed as a "factory producing proletarians" by
educating them in the discipline necessary for exploitation." In the same way
that for Marx the factory reveals the secrets of the free and equal sphere of cir-
culation, the prison reveals for Melossi and Pavarini the secrets of the other-
wise democratic appearance of the rules of criminal law. Equality before the
law and punishment on retributive principles are contradicted and undermined
by reformative purposes which allow the punishments to be tailored to the ex-
tent to which the offender shows himself or herself to be willing and able to
fulfill the assigned role of submission in the productive process.
MARXISM AND CANADIAN CRIMINAL LAW
In my opinion, this disciplinary paradigm, with the proper Marxist inter-
pretation, provides the key to understanding modern criminal law both in its
everyday and in its more obviously political uses. As an example of the more
obviously political uses, we have the long-running R.C.M.P. affair which
demonstrates the disciplinary thesis in the richest imaginable combination of
its terms. Here we have crimes committed in the exercise of a class-based
surveillance function which go unpunished by virtue of a system of criminal
law concerned not with the punishment of crime but with discipline. The story
has often been recounted, especially by me,34 so I will briefly summarize it.
Crimes are committed by the police against various left-wing groups in an ef-
fort to suppress what is essentially legal political activity in the interest of
social change. But the ordinarily swift and efficient "criminal justice system"
which processes hundreds of thousands of cases each year in its predictable
succession of investigations, trials and punishments suddenly becomes stricken
by a strange paralysis of indecision. The system suddenly loses confidence in
itself (actually, the police lose confidence in the system) and proceeds
31Ibid., at 222.
32Ibid., at 308.
3 D. Melossi and M. Pavarini, The Prison and the Factory: Origins of the Penitentiary System, G. Cousin
(trans.) (London: The Martins Press, 1981) 145.
14M. Mandel, "The Discrediting of the McDonald Commission" (1982), 61 Can. Forum 14; "McDonald and the
R.C.M.P." in Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, Ideas: Law and Social Order I (Toronto: C.B.C.
Transcripts, 1983) 1; and "Democracy, Class and Canadian Sentencing Law" (1984), 21 Crime and Social Justice
163.
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hesitatingly with a plethora of new precautionary measures. First there has to
be a Royal Commission (the McDonald Commission), packed with trusted
friends and associates - naturally lawyers - of the alleged Liberal Party
masterminds of the offences." The Commission must then take four years to
absolve (unsurprisingly, on the flimsiest of grounds) those very friends of any
legal or political responsibility for the crimes it admits did occur. With respect
to those crimes, the Commission has the temerity to recommend that the "ap-
propriate authorities" (which in many cases include these self-same Liberal
friends just absolved), decide what to do about the perpetrators of crimes
within their jurisdiction, with the proviso that those who were "just following
orders" be absolved. This would bring matters just about to "square one",
give or take a few steps, except for the fact that before even releasing the Com-
missioner's report, the Federal government hires two more Liberal lawyers
(one of them an ex-Supreme Court of Canada justice) to discredit the Commis-
sion's legal findings that crimes had indeed been committed and releases their
"opinions" with the report, describing them as having been written by "in-
dependent outside legal counsel". (This complicated subplot of the legal
analysis of the McDonald Commission is a good example of how what are
essentially esoteric questions of abstract legality, debated hotly among experts,
can become important political issues. Rarely has there been such a public ex-
hibition of the glorious inconclusiveness and manipulability of legal
materials.) There follows a number of increasingly astounding events, in-
cluding the spectacle of the then Attorney-General, Mark MacGuigan, an-
nouncing in November 1982 that the decision had been taken secretly four
months earlier by his predecessor (Jean Chretien) not to prosecute anybody
and that since that decision had been taken by a prior attorney-general,
nobody would take responsibility for it! On the provincial side (outside of
Quebec, the governing party of which was after all a victim of R.C.M.P.
crimes) not only have there been no prosecutions but the Attorney-General of
Ontario has actually intervened to stop private prosecutions of Mounties by
their victims. 6
No doubt there was a good measure of hypocrisy and "saving of one's
own skin" involved in this affair. But this aspect is not the most interesting
one from the point of view of legal theory. What is interesting is the persistent
form of excuse which has found itself into the rhetoric of the various apologias
for the failure to prosecute these criminals and for the failure of judges to
punish them when they have been found guilty, as some have been in Quebec.
This argument addresses the motives of the offenders and speaks volumes
about the rule of law. According to the explanation released by the Depart-
ment of Justice: "There was no suggestion ... that the members were
motivated by anything save a desire to effectively protect the national security
or enforce the criminal law. The members were not motivated by personal
gain, whether financial or otherwise". 7 Now, as I have argued elsewhere, the
"See the evidence and judgment in Re Copeland and McDonald et al. (1979), 42 C.C.C. (2d) 334 (F.C.T.D.), 88
D.L.R. (3d) 724, 11978] 2 F.C. 815.
3"Dowson v. The Queen (1983), 7 C.C.C. (3d) 527 (S.C.C.).
37Department of Justice Canada, Position of the Attorney General of Canada on Certain Recommendations of
the McDonald Commission, (Ottawa, 1983) 11.
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motive excuse turns out to be really a way of distinguishing between the
various concrete social interests which are served (or disserved) by the conduct
involved.3" It can therefore minimize what would otherwise be very serious
crime, such as the breaking and entering and theft committed by the R.C.M.P.
against the left-wing Agence de presse libre du Qu6bec, which was transformed
into a lesser charge by virtue of the omnibus section 115 of the Criminal Code
so that the offenders could be congratulated and given an absolute discharge
for their "noble and selfless purpose" 9 . Or it can aggravate an otherwise non-
imprisonable offence when the same omnibus provision is used to enable the
court to imprison a rebellious trade unionist, such as Jean-Claude Parrot, for
deliberately "challenging and defying the authority of Parliament" and hav-
ing no "remorse"."o What distinguishes these cases is neither the legal
character of the offences nor their concrete harmfulness to any victims nor
even the personal nobility, sincerity or selflessness of the actors, but rather the
social interests being defended and opposed in each case. In disrupting the ac-
tivities of a group formed to defend workers, poor people, students, native
peoples and the Quebec Independence Movement, the R.C.M.P. was acting on
behalf of not just "the government", but of the ruling interests whose
dominance is defined by the subordinance of the groups just listed. Parrot, on
the other hand, was acting on behalf of workers and against the government
and, in-effect, employers in general - all of whom have a vested interest in
holding down public sector wages. In these cases the law, by a very selective
and misleading concern with motives, really tailors itself to be the handmaiden
of powerful social interests. The primary mechanisms operating here are all
those discretionary aspects of criminal law from enforcement through to
sentence and the execution of sentence,,sa all of which undermine the seeming-
ly universal form of criminal prohibition: "Everyone who does x is guilty of an
offence and is liable to n years imprisonment".
The examples I have just given are famous ones about which much has
been made during the ten years since the police crimes were first revealed. But
part of the reason for the success of the criminals in escaping punishment has
to do with the fact that the excuses upon which they relied and the discre-
tionary and disciplinary mechanisms through which they escaped are really
part of the accepted everyday reality of criminal law. This point is worth em-
phasizing because it demonstrates the continuity between "political" and
"non-political" crime and punishment. The virtually exclusive and greatly
disproportionate use of prisons and other intrusive forms of punishment for
economically marginal groups is not at all due to the application of an equal
law to persons in unequal circumstances as it is sometimes suggested even by
' 8M. Mandel, A National Referendum on the Cruise Missile (Ottawa: Operation Dismantle, Inc. 1983).
39R. v. Coutellier, Cobb and Cormier. Unreported decision of the Cour de Sessions de la Paix, Montreal, Vin-
cent J., 16 June 1977, a translation of which is reprinted in L. Arbour and L.T. Taman, Criminal Procedure:
Cases, Text and Materials (Toronto: Emond-Montgomery, 1981) 240.
4
0R. v. Parrot. Unreported decision of Evans C.J.O. of the High Court of Justice for Ontario, 7 May 1979. The
appeal, which did not concern the sentence, is reported in (1980), 27 O.R. (2d) 333.
40aParrot not only received a prison sentence, but was refused temporary absence when he was eligible.
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those trying to apply a Marxist analysis.4' The general results of research into
the actual bases for the invocation of criminal sanctions is quite overwhelming
in its conclusion that the criminal law is applied in anything but an equal man-
ner where class is concerned. This phenomenon occurs at all levels of the
system, including the judicial sentencing stage. I have shown elsewhere42 how
the Canadian sentencing system departs substantially from democratic prin-
ciples of equality before the law and is as much concerned with the enforce-
ment of the social relations of production (that is, class relations) as it is with
the prevention of harm to individuals through crime. Sentencing judges con-
sistently tailor sentences to the degree to which an offender , whatever the of-
fence, fulfils his or her role in the productive system, and to the degree to
which offences, whatever their legal severity and the harm they do to in-
dividuals, oppose or protect the "productive relations" status quo. This is
made possible by an institutional structure reposing great discretionary
authority in sentencing courts and by a legal theory which both guides and
legitimates the exercise of this discretion on the bases of "denunciation" and
"rehabilitation".
Furthermore, whatever democratic elements exist in sentencing (that is,
those that vary the punishment according to the concrete harmfulness of the
conduct and the legal characterization of the offence), are completely under-
mined by what Foucault has called "the principle of the modulation of
penalties" '4 3 . In the prison system, this principle comprehends all those varia-
tions in penalty which penal authorities administer, including the location of
the prisoner on the infinitely graded continuum between minimum and super-
maximum security, temporary absences, various forms of "remission" and
the largest single modulator, the parole system." In the decision as to what
proportion of his or her prison sentence a prisoner will serve outside of prison
under the parole board's discretionary authority, the offence itself recedes en-
tirely into the background and the important factors have almost everything to
do with the individual. The parole board seeks to discover, through a variety
of tests stretching back before the offence was committed and continuing
through the prison sentence to the parole period, who among those in its
charge will or will not accept their assigned role in the general authority struc-
ture which, ovet the vast realm of the "private sphere", is none other than the
class structure. For those few who hold dominant positions, so-called "cor-
porate criminals", there is no difficulty in making this determination. Prison
was not meant for them in the first place. But for most people, the role which
the productive process assigns to them is subordination to the arbitary per-
sonal authority of capital. Consequently, the parole board expects them to
demonstrate their willingness to submit to arbitrary personal authority
wherever it exists. Parole thus intensifies those undemocratic features of the
sentencing process which make punishment depend upon who one is and not
upon what one has done. In so doing, parole further sacrifices (to the point of
4I.D. Balbus, "Commodity Form and Legal Form: An Essay on the 'Relative Autonomy' of the Law" (1977),
II Law and Society Rev. 571.
4
2 Supra, footnote 34, "Democracy, Class and Canadian Sentencing Law".
4
3
Supra, footnote 29 at 269.
44M. Mandel, "Democracy, Class and the National Parole Board (1985), 27 Crim. L.Q. 159.
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complete abandonment) the goal of prevention of harm to victims of crime to
the goal of strengthening class relations. The sentencing and parole systems
combined, therefore, contrary to what might be expected from reading either
the Constitution or the Criminal Code, reveal the criminal law to be
"superstructural" in the sense that it is concerned with the strengthening of
class relations and the social status quo as distinct from the defence of the legal
status quo of equal citizenship and equal protection of the law.
E.P. THOMPSON AND THE TWO SENSES OF THE "RULE OF LAW"
Classicial Marxism thus contains a powerful critique of the rule of law
which is essential to understanding actual, current legal institutions and prac-
tices; recent years have seen a resurgence and a refinement of this critique.
Now this has caused at least as much of a negative reaction on the left as it has
on the right. Several socialist scholars 5 have expressed great discomfort with
the traditional and renewed Marxist devaluation of the rule of law. There seem
to be two major elements to this discomfort. One has to do with the Stalin
period in the U.S.S.R. It seems to be felt that a Marxist devaluation of law in
theory condones and even prepares the way for the Stalin period's very real
devaluation of law in practice. More extreme versions of the critique implicitly
blame Pashukanis' theory for his own liquidation, calling it a "jurisprudence
of terror".' 6 Secondly, there seems to be some embarrassment over a supposed
inconsistency between devaluing law theoretically and engaging in political
struggles which inevitably involve legality in some way or another, whether in
defending attacks on legal rights from the right or in pressing for new, better
and stronger legal rights from the left. Classical Marxism's devaluation of law
has made Marxists defensive about taking law seriously as well as making
socialist activists defensive about Marxism. The result has been a revolt aimed
at investing the rule of law with revolutionary respectability.
One of the main sources of inspiration for this revolt on the left and un-
questionably its most powerful and eloquent statement yet is found in the
work of E.P. Thompson. The locus classicus is the widely read conclusion to
his Whigs and Hunters of 1975. Whigs and Hunters is a social and political
history of the aptly-named "Black Act" of 1723 which applied liberal doses of
the death penalty to the participants in class struggles between the great finan-
cial and merchant bourgeoisie (who had occupied the centre of government
and were exploiting the perquisites of office including large country estates)
and the rural gentry, yeoman farmers and other forest people whose
customary rights were being eroded and infringed. The "Black Act" was a
piece of class legislation if there ever was one, "serving first of all the interest
of Government's own closest supporters". 7 In addition to applying the death
4'See, supra, footnote 14; V. Rabinowitz, "The Radical Tradition in Law" in D. Kariys (ed.), The Politics of
Law: A Progressive Critique (New York: Random House, 1984); D. Sugarman, "Introduction and Overview" in
D. Sugarman (ed.), Legality, Ideology and the State (London: Academic Press, 1983); and R. Kinsey,
"Despotism and Legality" in B. Fine et al. (eds.), Capitalism and the Rule of Law: Front Deviancy Theory to
Marxism (London: Hutchison, 1979).
46Supra, footnote 14, "Law and Civil Rights in Marxist Theory"; and P. Beirne and R. Sharlet, Pashukanis:
Selected Writings on Marxism and Law (London: Academic Press, 1980).
4
7 E.P. Thompson, Whigs and Hunters: The Origin of the Black Act (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1975)
206.
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penalty to any manner of interference with property, the Act contained some
interesting innovations such as execution for failure to surrender within a
specified timed after being accused," the concept of collective responsibility
and abrogation of local venue rules. These already ample provisions were fur-
ther enlarged by an obliging judiciary, not only ready as ever "to wag their
tails for the ruling classes" 9 , but which actually was that class in the case of
John Pepper who, as the Justice of the Peace in a prosecution he himself had
brought, imprisoned adversaries without the nicety of legal grounds."0 In this
era of the suspension of habeas corpus and prosecutions against the press, it
was nothing for the Chief Justice (Lord Mansfield) to compel text-writer Sir
Michael Foster (a former judge) to suppress from his writings the report of a
case of dubious but enlarging interpretation in which Lord Mansfield had
dissented and then later to rely upon this case as an unreported, but "very
deliberately considered" authority.' Whether a prosecution would be launched
under the "Black Act" was influenced strongly by the presence or absence
of ministerial protection, and acquittals - even on trumped-up charges - had
to be dearly purchased with expensive legal fees. Pardons then, as paroles
now, depended heavily on social position. Latter-day attorney-generals an-
ticipated Roy McMurtry, former Attorney-General of Ontario,52 by stepping
in to stop "iron-clad" prosecutions of their own authorities when they com-
mitted crimes in the defence of property." Thus "the flexibility of the law"
has a long history.
At the end of this long and painstaking chronicle of the trampling under
of anything resembling the rule of law, Thompson comes to its defence. It is,
he says, "a cultural achievement of universal significance" 5 and "an un-
qualified human good"", despite the unavoidable admission that "[i]n a con-
text of gross class inequalities, the equity of law must always be in some part
sham" 4 . Thompson's argument is essentially that, though inevitably under-
mined by class divisions, the rule of law still imposes significant limitations on
power because were it otherwise its ideological value would be nil:
If the law is evidently partial and unjust, it will mask nothing, legitimize nothing,
contribute nothing to any class's hegemony .... [Tihe rulers were, in serious senses,
whether willingly or unwillingly, the prisoners of their own rhetoric; they played the
games of power according to rules which suited them, but they could not break those
rules or the whole game would be thrown away."
4
SThis provision was applied at least once: ibid., at 173.
49Supra, footnote 7 at 903.
"
0Supra, footnote 47 at 172.
"Ibid., at 253.
52Supra, footnote 35.
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Can anyone deny that placing limits on official power is a worthwhile project?
Thompson argues that a crucial way in which limits are placed is by never ceas-
ing to insist upon the ideal of the rule of law, however aware we are as Marx-
ists and socialists of its persistent "sham part" in class society. Far from justi-
fying an actual practice or institution, then, Thompson defends a critical
posture which holds existing institutions up to their own standards. The final
chapter in Whigs and Hunters is really Thompson's attempt to justify and ex-
plain why he has taken legal injustice seriously and thus why we should take
law seriously even in the face of other, perhaps more materially significant,
aspects of class power. Part of the reason for Thompson's insistence has to do
with Nazism and Stalinism: "[t]o deny or belittle [the rule of law] is, in this
dangerous century ... a self-fulfilling error, which encourages us to give up the
struggle against bad laws and class-bound procedures, and to disarm ourselves
before power"." Another has to do with being true to the actual forms taken
by popular resistance to oppression:
[F]ar from the ruled shrugging off this rhetoric as an hypocrisy, some part of it at
least was taken over as part of the rhetoric of the plebeian crowd, of the "free-born
Englishman" with his inviolable privacy, his habeas corpus, his equality before the
law .... [Slome of [these individuals] had the impertinence, and the imperfect sense
of historical perspective, to expect justice. On the gallows men would actually com-
plain in their "last dying words", if they felt that in some particular the due forms
of law had not been undergone. (We remember Vulcan Gates complaining that since
he was illiterate he could not read his own notice of proclamation; and performing
his alloted role at Tyburn only when he had seen the Sheriff's dangling chain.) 9
We might sum all this up by saying that the appeal for Thompson in the
rule of law lies entirely in its democratic virtues. It places inhibitions on power
and thus becomes a source of popular (defensive) power and figures strongly
along with other legal notions as the language and form of popular resistance
to oppression. Though this democratic theme is rather deeply buried in the
polemics of the conclusion to Whigs and Hunters, it is brought to the surface
in Thompson's later writings on law collected in Writing by Candlelight. Here
what is decried is the interference with or replacement of popular legal institu-
tions, such as the coroner's jury and the criminal jury, by that other most legal
of institutions, the judiciary, which Thompson anything but celebrates: "[N]o
British liberty has ever arisen from the decision of judges". 60 Thompson
himself is very anxious to distinguish between the "rule of law" and "the rule
of the people by any old codger in a wig''". It seems to me that in order to
understand what is going on here we need in fact to recognize frankly that
there are two opposing senses of the rule of law: the democratic and the
juridical. The democratic sense, invoked by Thompson, is one that stresses the
inhibitions placed on official power (including judicial power) by clear rules
strictly applied and adhered to, ideally in the context of popular institutions of
law-making and legal procedure. Even more ideally, these rules contribute in
content to real equality and freedom. This is the ideal invoked by the slogan "a
" bid., at 266.
"Ibid., at 263, 268.
6 0E.P. Thompson, Writing by Candlelight (London: The Merlin Press, 1980) 218.
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government of laws and not of men". The juridical sense, described by
Pashukanis, is the one that stresses those characteristic features of judicial ad-
ministration which work to strengthen the status quo of unequal social power,
including the free-willed legal subject abstracted from its social context, the
legal discretion of criminal punishment, the case-by-case analysis of the com-
mon law and the hegemony of the legal profession. We will return to this
distinction shortly, but this elaboration should suffice for present purposes.
Not only is it clear that it is the democratic and not the juridical rule of
law which Thompson is anxious to protect, but it is also clear that in this
endeavour he is not at all at odds with classical Marxism. Marx was well aware
of the importance of inscribing political victories in law. Even as he blasted the
"juridical illusion" and the "tail-wagging judges", he wrote in Capital of the
greatly valued struggle to limit the length of the working day: "In the place of
the pompous catalogue of the 'inalienable rights of man' there steps the
modest Magna Carta of the legally limited working day, which at least makes
clear 'when the time which the worker sells is ended and when his own
begins' ".11
In the Critique of the Gotha Programme, Marx criticized the call for a
"free state" on the basis that democracy required restrictions on the freedom of
state: "Freedom consists in converting the state from an organ superimposed
upon society into one completely subordinate to it, and today, too, the
forms of state are more free or less free to the extent that they restrict the
'freedom of the state' "." So Marx had a completely different view of legality
when it was at the service of democracy. That is why, for example, he con-
gratulated the Communards for subjecting the judiciary to popular control,
but did not exhort them to abolish the institution: "Like the rest of public ser-
vants, magistrates and judges were to be elective, responsible, and
revocable"."
This is not to say that there are no serious disagreements between Thomp-
son and classical Marxism. For one thing, Marx was unrelenting in his in-
sistence on the necessity not only of linking science to politics, as in the famous
1 1th thesis on Feuerbach,6" but also of linking politics to science. His entire
body of work, especially the "political" tracts from the Communist Manifesto
to the Critique of the Gotha Programme, underscores his belief that political
agitation must be done on the basis of a true understanding of capitalism and
its law. This belief naturally entailed a merciless critique which did not take at
all seriously the prejudices and misconceptions of the ruling class even if they
were shared by the exploited. 6 Furthermore, his point of reference for both
politics and science was always socialism, with which, he writes in the Preface
1
2
Supra, footnote 7 at 416.
63Supra, footnote I at 564.




Supra, footnote I at 158: "The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to
change it".
66Id.: "In every epoch the ideas of the ruling class are the ruling ideas."
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to A Critique of Political Economy, "the prehistory of human society [is
brought] to a close". 6 7 Thompson on the other hand, perhaps as part of his
laudable effort to give dignity to popular forms of protest," seems incapable
of penetrating beneath popular conceptions which are not always democratic
but often authoritarian (as in the episode with Vulcan Gates where the symbol
of the Sheriff convinces the condemned man to cease resistance). More impor-
tantly, this analysis seems to have unhinged Thompson's practical political
programme in defence of democratic rights from the struggle for socialism,
thereby preventing him from coming to grips not only with the severe limita-
tions on democratic rights in capitalism, restricted as they inevitably are to the
public sphere, but also with their inherent fragility in the face of the enormous-
ly undemocratic and overwhelming power of the private sphere. Thus Perry
Anderson has written:
The full potential of the political issues of democracy raised by Thompson can only
be realized by persistent and public demonstration of their convergence in socialism.
Radical libertarian campaigns in the present are not to be won with continuist ap-
peals to a constitutional past, but by credible programmes for a common future
finally emancipated from it."
So Thompson and classical Marxism seem to disagree on the strategy for
preserving what little democracy there can be under capitalism and for expan-
ding it beyond those narrow horizons. But the important point for present pur-
poses is that they seem to agree on the antithetical nature of the two aspects of
the rule of law which I have called "democratic" and "juridical".
Failure to appreciate this ambiguity in the notion of the rule of law is not
only at the heart of the controversy over Thompson but is also the basis for the
many misunderstandings of the significance of the work of Pashukanis, whose
contribution was to isolate that aspect of legality which was specifically
bourgeois and therefore inevitably repressive. It was this element that he called
the specifically "legal" element, which is a far cry from condemning "all law"
(that is, everything we know as "law") as bourgeois, even if only "in form".
70
It is even further from suggesting that there should be no limits to official
power in socialism." This element consisted in the centrality of a private,
isolated, autonomous and egoistic legal subject possessed above all of a free
will, so that it could be considered apart from the concrete conditions of class
71bid., at 390.
"8 E.M. Wood, "The Separation of the Economic and the Political in Capitalism" (1981), 127 New Left Rev. 66.
69P. Anderson, Arguntents Within English Marxisn (London: New Left Books, 1980) 205.
7"Supra, footnote 14, "Pashukanis and the 'Jurisprudence of Terror' ".
"Though I do not deal directly in this paper with law under socialism, it is worth a few words because of the ef-
fect which phenomena such as Stalinism have had on the current socialist critique of the traditional Marxist
devaluation of law. In short, it seems to me that socialism poses no distinct problems for the analysis of the rule
of law. This certainly seems to have been Marx's own position in the material quoted earlier. Democratic limits
on power are clearly indispensable under socialism. Without them we simply do not have socialism. On the other
hand the importance of the distinction between the democratic and juridical notions of the rule of law persists in
the quest for democratic socialist political institutions. To put it in Thompson's terms, we will obviously have to
continue to insist on the ideal of the (democratic) rule of law even when its "sham part" has been reduced or
eliminated by the reduction or elimination of social class power. Otherwise I have nothing to add on this subject
and it is consequently unnecessary for me to evaluate the complicated arguments of, for example, P. Hirst's
"Law, Socialism and Rights" in P. Carlen and M. Collison (eds.), Radical Issues in Criminology (Oxford: Mar-
tin Robertson, 1980).
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and history in which real human beings and legal decisions are situated. This
legal classlessness which paradoxically enforced and legitimated oppressive
class relations was thus the antithesis of real democracy because it excluded
from the reach of democracy the entire realm of the so-called "private
sphere". It has been argued, and with some plausibility, that Pashukanis' ap-
proach to law is of declining relevance in late capitalism which is defined by
the merger of the private and public spheres through state involvement in the
economy. Thus there is a proliferation of many "laws" which, though far
from democratic, do not seem to assume this juridical form. These laws en-
compass the detailed, often class-specific, and end-oriented regulatory legisla-
tion which is the form taken by much modern government activity. The argu-
ment that the proliferation of these norms has superseded Pashukanis' theory
has been made explicitly by Fraser72 and O'Malley73 , and implicitly by Gabel7 '
and Gabel and Feinman t . The latter have underscored the more com-
munitarian and less "atomized" form of legitimation being practiced by the
legal defenders of the status quo of late capitalism. It must be noticed, of
course, that this development was well under way when Pashukanis was
writing and that he was fully aware of its implications. He distinguished very
sharply between "technical and legal norms" 76 and recognized that "every
juridical theory of the state which attempts to encompass all state functions is
nowadays inadequate".
It seems to me, however, that despite these factors Pashukanis' approach
is of continuing and even increasing relevance in late capitalism precisely
because it helps us grasp the distinction between the two senses of the rule of
law which I have been trying to elucidate. For one thing, the juridical factor is
far from eclipsed in modern law. For example, as we saw earlier, it remains the
focal point for the subversion of democracy by class relations in criminal law
and punishment.7 8 But the importance of this approach lies not only in theper-
sistence but also in the expansion of the juridical factor in modern life. In fact,
the ambiguity in the notion of the rule of the law and the contradiction be-
tween its two senses is to be found increasingly close to the centre of Canadian
politics on issues of great, and in one case of potentially earth-shattering, im-
portance.
2
A. Fraser, "The Legal Theory We Need Now", (40-41), Socialist Revolution 147.
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Supra, footnote 15 at 79.
77Ibid., at 137.
78There is a strong link between the work of Melossi and Pavarini on the one hand and Pashukanis on the other.
See, supra, footnote 33 at 56, 182.
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THE RULE OF LAW, THE LEGALIZATION OF POLITICS
AND THE CRUISE MISSILE
It is this precise ambiguity in the notion of the rule of law that was utilized
by the drafters of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, who placed it
at the head of a document that marked the ascendency of the juridical rule of
law at the expense of the democratic rule of law: "Whereas Canada is founded
upon principles that recognize the supremacy of God and the rule of law"."
And it was this ambiguity that was exploited by the Federal government in
claiming that the Charter "transferred power to the people". As the Govern-
ment of Canada itself explained, the only power it gave the people was "the
power to appeal to the courts"."0 Neither the richness of this ambiguity nor its
potential in riches was lost on the Canadian Bar Association when it declared
April 17 (the day of the Charter's proclamation) to be "Law Day", so that an
annual promotional campaign could be undertaken for the legal profession.'
Precisely speaking, the Charter transferred legal power to the courts not to ap-
ply laws but to strike them down on the basis of an enactment that hardly even
pretended to guide that power.
Glasbeek and I have characterized the enactment of the Charter as part of
a trend, which we hypothesized to be pervasive, toward the "legalization of
politics", using "legal" here in the traditional (juridical) Marxist sense.82 This
general trend, we argue, is due to the specific accumulation and legitimation
problems, noted by several authors,83 which confront advanced capitalist
countries in our epoch. As the public and private spheres become "recoupled"
through state involvement in the economy, accumulation becomes politicized.
This occurs, and not only by coincidence, as capitalism becomes increasingly
unable to deliver the goods: that is, as capitalist relations of production in-
creasingly stand between people and their production and consumption needs.
Consequently, capitalism must seek forms of legitimation that are abstract (in
the sense that they do not depend on meeting people's concrete needs) and that
avoid the genuine participatory democracy which might endanger the freedom
to accumulate. The institutionalization of judicial review which the Charter
represents, is a logical response, we argue, not only because of the reliability of
the courts as protectors of the social status quo, which makes litigation a safe
alternative to genuine democracy, but also because of the form of legal
discourse by which the legal profession justifies both the status quo and its role
in defending it. We argue, following Pashukanis, that legalized (juridical)
discourse even in late capitalism is legitimation of a characteristically abstract
"Part 1, Constitution Act, 1982 which is Schedule B, Canada Act 1982, 1982 (U.K.) c. II, Preamble.
"Government of Canada, The Constitution and You (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1983).
8"On 18 April 1983, the Canadian Bar Association took out a four-page "Special Advertising Feature" in The
Globe and Mail which, along with the many private law firm advertisements, included items such as: "Know your
rights: The new Charter should be studied by every Canadian", "Our court system: an integrated structure" and
"When you need a lawyer, where do you go?". See also "Contests, mock trials mark Law Day today", Toronto
Star, 17 April 1984.
"1H.J. Glasbeek and M. Mandel, "The Legalization of Politics in Advanced Capitalism: The Canadian Charter
of Rights and Freedoms", [1984] 2 Socialist Studies 84.
"J. O'Connor, The Fiscal Crisis of the State (New York: St. Martins Press, 1923); J. Habermas, Legitimation
Crisis, T. McCarthy (trans.) (Boston: Beacon Press, 1975); and, supra, footnote 68.
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type which suppresses the historical and material (class) aspects of the conflicts
with which it deals, by treating them instead as questions of "principle" con-
cerning the rights of free-willing legal subjects. As contrasted with other
political institutions, courts are constrained to prefer arguments of a deon-
tological rather than utilitarian nature, rights to goods and principles to
policies. Their increasing prominence in the resolution of political controversy
signifies a corresponding advance for their particular rhetoric. Legalized
politics is simulated politics, intended (like other forms of capitalist politics) to
domesticate class struggle, but in a way better suited to the problems of late
capitalism than are other forms of politics.
It is clear that in Canada there were specific local and immediate goals
pre-eminent in the whole process of setting this mechanism in place, namely
the protection of minority language rights (especially English rights in Quebec)
to offset the centrifugal forces working against the Canadian union. But there
can be little doubt of the importance of the general trend to legalized politics as
the means to this difficult specific end. For example, a crucial ingredient in the
entrenchment of the Charter was the decisions of the Supreme Court of
Canada in the Constitution Reference cases of 1981,84 which provided an ac-
ceptable formula for amending the Constitution even without the participation
of Quebec and obviated the need for a "divisive" referendum. The enactment
of the general supervisory provisions of the Charter functioned in a similar
manner to provide a justification for the judicial enforcement of the very
specific language provisions guaranteeing English language education in
Quebec contrary to the provisions of Quebec's Charter of the French
Language. The tortuous judgment of Deschenes C.J.S.C., striking down this
popular and otherwise valid Quebec law,8" is a perfect illustration of how uni-
quely specific the language provisions of the Charter are when compared to the
more general provisions. On appeal, the Quebec Court of Appeal simply
recognized that the provisions of the Constitution were "adopted with a
precise and resolute purpose of restricting the effects" of the Quebec law and
were "so precise" and "so specific" that the ordinary rules of Charter inter-
pretation could not apply. 6 The Supreme Court of Canada took essentially
the same approach in unanimously affirming the judgment invalidating Bill
101.17
The phenomenon of legalized politics finds perhaps its most vivid illustra-
tion in the bizarre and ironic Operation Dismantle case88 , the issue of earth-
shattering importance to which I referred above. I want to conclude by outlin-
14Re: Resolution to Amend the Constitution, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 753; and Re: Attorney-General of Quebec and
Attorney-General of Canada (1982), 140 D.L.R. (3d) 385 (S.C.C.).
"Quebec Association of Protestant School Boards et al. v. A ttorney-General of Quebecet al. (No. 2) (1982), 140
D.L.R. (3d) 33 (Que. S.C.).
86Quebec Association of Protestant School Boards et al. v. Attorney-General of Quebec et al. (No. 2) (1984), I
D.L.R. (4th) 573 (Que. C.A.) at 576.
'7 Attorney-General of Quebec v. Quebec Association of Protestant School Boards et al. (No. 2) (1984), 10
D.L.R. (4th) 321 (S.C.C.).
"Operation Dismantle Inc. et al. v. Canadaet al., [1983] 1 F.C. 429; appeal allowed by the Federal Court of Ap-
peal (1984), 3 D.L.R. (4th) 193, [19831 1 F.C. 745; affirmed by the Supreme Court of Canada (1985), 59 N.R. 1.
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ing this case in some detail as my personal involvement with it has made me
privy to some information which, while not secret, is not as widely known as it
should be, even in Canada. In July 1983 the Federal government announced its
decision to accede to requests to allow the American government to conduct a
series of cruise missile tests in Canada. The first test actually took place on 6
March 1984. Opinion polls indicated that most Canadians who had an opinion
on the matter opposed the tests. Those of us opposed believe that allowing
these tests brings us significantly closer to a nuclear holocaust, partly because
of the unverifiability of the cruise missile, which makes arms' agreements
almost impossible, and partly because of its potential first strike capability.
Further, refusing the tests was one of the few ways to demonstrate concretely
to the American people our independence from and opposition to their
government's aggressive, brutal, dangerous and, incidentally, lawless foreign
policy of which the United States' nuclear hegemony is the major symbol. 9
(This point or something like it was made with great force by E.P. Thompson
when he spoke in Toronto on 25 August 1983.) However, this popular opposi-
tion to cruise testing did not find a proportionate expression in Parliament
where the two major parties combined to defeat a New Democtratic Party mo-
tion against the test 213 to 34.
Most Canadians know that following the government's announcement, a
coalition of peace groups headed by Operation Dismantle commenced an ac-
tion in the Federal Court to have the tests declared unconstitutional as con-
trary to section 7 of the Charter, which guarantees the right to life, liberty and
security of the person. They know this because every stage of the action -
from the footsteps of Operation Dismantle's lawyer into the Federal Court
building to file the papers, to the rejection by Cattanach J. of the
government's motion to have the suit thrown out, to the acceptance of that
motion by a unanimous Federal Court of Appeal, to the unsuccessful appeal
by Operation Dismantle to the Supreme Court of Canada - was carefully
photographed, reported and analyzed in the media. It would have been hard to
be in Canada during the second half of 1983 without knowing of the Operation
Dismantle action.
On the other hand, very few people seem to know that this court action
was only one of two initiatives spearheaded by Operation Dismantle against
the cruise missile. The other was a proposal for a binding national referendum
on the issue, launched in August following Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau's
statement that he would "reconsider" the tests if it could be demonstrated to
him that a majority of Canadians were opposed to them.9 ' Though reputedly a
deep thinker, Trudeau could not imagine how this could be done outside of a
general election fought on the issue of membership in NATO; Operation
Dismantle thought a referendum with the simple question: "Are you in favour
of the cruise missile being tested in Canada? Yes or No" would suffice. The
"See the condemnation by the International Court of Justice of U.S. mining of Nicaraguan harbours, in The
Globe and Mail, II May 1984, of which the United States' nuclear hegemony is the major symbol (This point or
something like it was made with great force by E.P. Thompson when he spoke in Toronto on 25 August 1983).
"Supra, footnote 38.
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organization expressed its willingness, however, to include a separate question
on NATO membership. 9'
The proposal for a referendum on the cruise tests was announced at a press
conference on 2 August 1983 in Toronto, chaired by Mayor Arthur Eggleton
who announced himself in favour of the idea and said he would vote against
cruise tests and for membership in NATO. But a curious thing happened.
The media, frothing at the mouth about the court case, was not interested in
the referendum. The electronic media virtually blacked it out (one national
radio announcement and one local TV story). Two of the major Toronto
papers (the anti-cruise Star and the right-wing Sun) prominently reported the
story, while one (the pro-cruise Globe and Mail) buried it as deeply as possible.
Only the Star ran a second story; as news the referendum was completely dead
in a week. One may speculate as to the reasons for this attitude on the part of
the press, but partly it was due to a sure sense that the referendum would not
occur. This feeling was partly a self-fulfilling prophecy, but was also due to an
almost complete lack of support in Parliament. In fact, virtually the only
follow-up that Operation Dismantle did on the referendum was to poll all 282
Members of Parliament. Only 18 replied, of whom 15 opposed the referendum
and three were in favour. One MP wrote on his questionnaire: "This is pure
NDP". He could not have been more wrong. One of the biggest blows to the
referendum proposal was that it was opposed by NDP members on the recom-
mendation of their disarmament spokesperson Pauline Jewett. Her letter to
the NDP caucus of August 11, recommending opposition to the referendum
proposal, expressed an opposition in principle to binding referenda, arguing
that this would place what she apparently considered to be positive legislation
(bilingualism, abolition of capital punishment, right to abortion and foreign
aid) in jeopardy. But there was also a definite preference expressed, on this
issue at least, for the electoral process over even non-binding referenda.
Jewett's letter stated:
Canadians at the next federal election can make political choices that will reflect
their views and concerns about the cruise missile. Canadians can nominate federal
election candidates from all parties who will denounce and end cruise testing if
elected. Canadians can, if fact, put a government in place, the NDP, that will refuse
the cruise in Canada .... Elected politicians need a good shaking up and the govern-
ment of Canada should be changed for that fight.
It was obvious to everyone that the NDP had no hope of forming the next
government of Canada or of stopping the cruise missile test in a parliamentary
forum against the combined opposition of the Tories and the Liberals. As the
only party to oppose cruise testing, its self-interest in making a federal election
the only means of expressing opposition to the tests should also be obvious.
What is interesting about this episode is not the opportunism of a self-styled
"party of principle", but rather the way the NDP felt that it could consistently
oppose the referendum and yet support the court challenge by Operation
Dismantle, which it did vigorously both within and without Parliament, even
to the extent of protesting the government's appeal of the original ruling. A
9
Far from its first venture in the referendum business, Operation Dismantle had previously arranged 132
municipal referenda on general disarmament questions. In fact, the organization's main purpose and goal for its
seven years of existence was to have a worldwide referendum on balanced disarmament sponsored and organized
by the United Nations General Assembly.
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victory in the court case would, of course, have bound Parliament to the deci-
sion of a few judges. When challenged on this point at a speech at Osgoode
Hall Law School on 15 February 1984, Jewett said that "judicial decisions are
part of our democratic tradition and binding referendums are not".
Without institutional or press support and embroiled in the increasingly
expensive court battle,"2 Operational Dismantle simply had no time or energy
for pursuing the referendum. The supreme irony came on 21 December 1983
when the group announced that its seven-year quest for a UN sponsor for the
worldwide referendum had ended in success with Costa Rica agreeing to bring
it before the General Assembly. Operation Dismantle's newspaper, "The
Dismantler","' carried the large headline "WE DID IT" to announce the
event. Not one newspaper even mentioned that the sponsorship had occurred
(a wire story was simply not picked up); again there was a virtual blackout in
the electronic media. Not that Operation Dismantle was totally ignored by the
press on December 21. On that day there was more than adequate coverage of
the story that the Supreme Court of Canada had granted Operation Dismantle
leave to appeal. This effectively put Operation Dismantle out of operation for
the next year and a half, except for some brief moments in court during the
argument on the appeal and a failed attempt to stop the second test in
February 1985 by an interim injunction. To paraphrase Operation Dismantle's
leader, Jim Stark, the organization put all of its eggs in one legal basket - the
Supreme Court of Canada. In his view, expressed in January 1985 when the
massive protest marches against the cruise missile had dwindled from the tens
of thousands to the hundreds:
We made our decision a year and a half ago, that protest in the streets, letter-writing
campaigns, telephone campaigns were not going to stop the cruise missle tests. The
only chance of stopping those tests, short of the government seeing the light, was a
decision by the Supreme Court of Canada. So we have put our eggs in that basket."
Consequently, when the Supreme Court of Canada unanimously decided
against Operation Dismantle in May 1985, the group was reduced to trying to
salvage something from its near two-year quest by proclaiming that the deci-
sion was "a victory for the strength of the Charter and the civil rights and
liberties of Canadians", 9" on the ground that the Supreme Court of Canada
had recognized a judicial power to review Cabinet decisions on Charter
grounds. (This from a group that alleged in its Statement of Claim that testing
the cruise was a foot in the grave for all humanity!) Similar congratulatory
remarks were made by Liberal and NDP members in the House of Commons
when requesting the government not to insist on its right to costs. A Liberal
member characterized the decision as the "finest hour" of the Charter.9 6 An
"Operation Dismantle had been busily soliciting funds, having been denied access to the government's blatantly
biased Charter funding program. See The Globe and Mail, 30 November 1983; and (1984), Ont. Lawyer's Weekly
(16 March) 8.
'3(1983), Vol. 5, No. 4.
"
4Toronto Star, 20 January 1985 at A3.
"Ibid., 9 May 1985 at Al.
96John Nunziata, House of Commons Debates, 10 May 1985 at 4604; see also Liberal Warren Allmand to the
same effect at 4610.
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NDP member characterized it as "a very important court action ... which
established the fundamental principle that Cabinet decisions are subject to the
Charter of Rights"." The Prime Minister, in his response, agreed that the
courts' new role made this "the kind of a democracy ... for which we are all
thankful". 8 Though the Government did ultimately forgive its costs, Opera-
tion Dismantle's lawyers were apparently not so generous about their fees. 9
It is true that Operation Dismantle had hoped that its case, win or lose,
would have an educative effect. It certainly does not seem to have damaged the
affection we are all supposed to have for the Charter. But has it taught
anybody anything about nuclear weapons? If it has, it has probably taught
people that peace groups are not serious in their claims about the dangers of
these weapons. Certainly the Supreme Court of Canada's own reasoning did
nothing to dispel this. Though, as Wilson J. pointed out in her separate con-
curring opinion, a motion of this sort is usually disposed of by accepting the
allegations in the Statement of Claim as true for the purpose of determining
whether there is a case in law, the majority of the Supreme Court took the
most unusual step of expressing a view on the facts, without hearing any
evidence. Speaking for five of the six judges, Dickson C.J. held that the facts
alleged by Operation Dismantle, and, as several opinion polls showed, ac-
cepted by millions of Canadians, "could never be proven".' 0 The
unverifiability of the cruise missile, which Operation Dismantle alleged and
which it wanted to prove would render arms control agreements unen-
forceable, met with the response from the majority that "it is just as plausible
that lack of verification would have the effect of enhancing enforceability than
of undermining it, since an inability on the part of nuclear powers to verify
systems like the cruise missile could precipitate a system of enforcement based
on co-operation rather than surveillance".' 0' To the claim that deploying the
cruise missile could lead to a "pre-emptive strike or an accidental firing",'
0 2
the majority argued that "[i]t would be just as plausible to argue that foreign
states would improve their technology with respect to detection of missiles,
thereby decreasing the likelihood of accidental firing or a pre-emptive
strike".' 3 Thus a group formed to fight for popular democracy on disarma-
ment was sucked into the legal vortex, gutted, legalized and all but obliterated
by judges completely unresponsible to any electorate, who, without hearing
any evidence, may have lulled Canadians into a dangerously false sense of
security while everybody celebrated their authority to do so. This is legalized
politics par excellence.
On the other hand, the development of a court-centred politics has not
been wholeheartedly embraced even by the courts themselves. In fact the
"'Svend Robinson, ibid., 14 May 1985 at 4721.
9"lbid., 10 May 1985 at 4611.
"The Globe and Mail, 10 July 1985 at 8.
'0'Supra, footnote 88 at N.R. 11.
'"'Ibid., at 7.
'"Ibid., at 12 (unreported version, per Dickson C.J.).
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reasoning in this case and other ones under the Charter and debates about
them in the press and media suggest that Glasbeek and I mayhave neglected
something very important in our preliminary assessment of the Charter, which
we wrote before any cases were decided. This factor is the persistence of
parliamentary democracy itself as a legitimator,'0I which has figured heavily in
the denial of claims under the Charter. Two of the five judges'05 in the Opera-
tion Dismantle Federal Court appeal directly invoked it as one ground for de-
nying jurisdiction under the Charter to assess the government's decision. On
the other hand, none of the other three acknowledged any separation-of-
powers type constraints, invoking only the lack of judicial expertise on certain
matters (here defence)' 6 or ignoring the issue altogether'. On the question of
the propriety of judicial review, LeDain J.A. stated as boldly as had Cattanach
J. in the trial division: "The Charter places limits on both the sovereignty of
Parliament and on the prerogative powers of the Crown."'0 8 Appeals to
democracy were likewise made by two members of the Ontario Divisional
Court' 9 when it upheld the contitutionality of provincial wage controls in the
public sector in Re Service Employees' International Union,"  while declaring
nevertheless that the "right to strike" was included in the Charter protection
of "freedom of association". An appeal to the Ontario Court of Appeal was
disposed of in a manner that made it unnecessary to decide the constitutional
question. Moreover, the proposition that the right to strike was included in
"freedom of association" was expressly denied by the Federal Court of Ap-
peal in a case involving federal wage controls in the public sector.' In the lat-
ter case all of the judges invoked a lack of economic expertise but did not men-
tion parliamentary democracy." 2
""P. Anderson, "The Antinomies of Antonio Gramsci" (1977), 100 New Left Review 5, 27.
'"'Pratte and Ryan JJ.A.
'O'LeDain and Marceau JJ.A.
"07 Hugesson J.A.




gGalligan and Smith JJ.
1"(1983), 44 O.R. (2d) 392.
'' 'Public Service Alliance of Canada v. The Queen (1985), 55 N.R. 285.
' '2These wage control cases also form another interesting parallel with the cruise missile case when compared to
union response to the 1976 wage control program. Of course that program was much more pervasive than the
current one, going beyond the public sector, and indeed there was a court action based on federal jurisdiction,
the Charter not having yet been enacted. However, the fact remains that on that occasion the trouble was taken
to organize a one-day general strike to protect the law. This time, the unions went straight to court.
At this point, it is appropriate to comment on a suggestion by several readers that the relationship between
Marxism and the cruise missile is not very clear. This point of view seems to want to restrict Marxist analysis to
direct confrontation between capital and workers. However, Marxism has much more ambitious claims, namely
to explain even struggles which do not appear at all "economic" by reference to the economic structure of socie-
ty. It is my argument here that changes in the form of politics in general can best be understood by references to
changes in the economic structure occurring in late capitalism. Furthermore, it seems to me that the struggle over
the cruise missile in Canada and indeed international nuclear politics are also best understood from the point of
view of the United States' interests and capabilities as the world's foremost capitalist power. It should be obvious
to anyone that the United States' ability to have its way in Canada has something to do with economic power. I
would also not be the first to argue that relations between Quebec and English Canada have strong economic
elements to them and that the language issue in Quebec has strong class elements to it.
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Some judges, then, in refusing Charter claims, include in their rhetoric a
preference that certain matters be decided by parliament. Of course, in cases
upholding the social status quo as well as the legal status quo, courts can af-
ford to be democratic in their rhetoric. Even so, some judges do not find such
a posture necessary. Furthermore, no such preference for parliamentary
democracy is expressed, as would be expected, in decisions which invalidate
legislation. Desch~nes C.J.S.C. commenced his judgment in. the Protestant
School Board case with the declaration that the Charter "carries with it the at-
tribution to the courts of an important part of the legislative power"; 3 his
reasoning is remarkable for its absence of any restraint whatsoever. And in
striking down the Quebec government's attempt to exempt Quebec laws from
the Charter, the Quebec Court of Appeal has demonstrated that even clear ex-
ercises of the "legislative override" in section 33 can be subject to judicial
nullification.'" Furthermore, the Supreme Court of Canada's early decisions
under the Charter, in which the judges have been less than inhibited in striking
down legislation, pay minimal obeisance to notions of parliamentary
sovereignty. In Hunter v. Southam Inc."' the Supreme Court of Canada
unanimously struck down a provision of the Combines Investigation Act"
6
dealing with search and seizure, on the grounds that it departed from the
judicially established common law procedures laid out in the Criminal Code.
However, the Court did not even ask whether extraordinary provisions were
needed to deal with extremely powerful corporate criminals (in this case one of
the two major newspaper chains in the country alleged to have been involved
in collusive practices). All that was invoked was a "large and liberal interpreta-
tion" approach to the Charter, which, the court neglected to point out, in-
evitably narrows the field for Parliament. The Protestant School Board case
also pre-empted discussion of the rationale of the legislation in question by in-
terpreting the language provisions of the Charter as "unique";. 7 no mention
of issues of parliamentary democracy can be found in the decision. The same
was the case for the majority opinion in Operation Dismantle, which contains
no doubts whatsoever about judicial competence:
Cabinet decisions ... are ... reviewable in the courts and subject to judicial scrutiny
for compatibility with the Constitution. I have no doubt that the executive branch of
the Canadian Government is duty bound to act in accordance with the dictates of the
Charter .... I have no doubt that disputes of a political or foreign policy nature may
be properly cognizable by the courts (per Dickson C.J.)"
Though Wilson J. discussed the issue of judicial competence in political mat-
ters in her separate concurring judgment, it is essentially a defence of the
court's power, albeit by means of some less than convincing - indeed
question-begging - distinctions:
''3Supra, footnote 85 at 33.
''
4Alliance desprofesseurs de Montreal v. Procureur general du Quebec (unreported, 14 January 1985), thereby
perhaps rendering unnecessary the Canadian Bar Association's longstanding call for the repeal of section 33; see
The Globe and Mail, 16 March 1983).
'(1985), 55 N.R. 241.
'' 6R.S.C. c. C-23, s. 10.
'".Supra, footnote 87 at 335.
"sSupra, footnote 88 at N.R. 14, 19.
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[Tihe courts should not be too eager to relinquish their judicial review function
simply because they are called upon to exercise it in relation to weighty matters of
state. Equally, however, it is important to realize that judicial review is not the same
thing as substitution of the court's opinion on the merits for the opinion of the per-
son or body to whom a discretionary decision-making power has been committed
.... [Blecause the effect of the appellants' action is to challenge the wisdom of the
government's defence policy, it is tempting to say that the Court should in the same
way refuse to involve itself. However, 1 think this would be to miss the point, to fail
to focus on the question which is before us. The question before us is not whether
the government's defence policy is sound but whether or not it violates the ap-
pellants' rights under s.7 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. This is a totally
different question. I do not think there can be any doubt that this is a question for
the courts .... ,
We are clearly in a transitional phase during which the courts are not yet
sure of their footing. Furthermore, it is reasonable to expect a change in
rhetoric once the practice of deciding these matters in court becomes more
familiar. And the "medium" has its own "message"; that is, the practice itself
is a kind of discourse, however judges may reason. On the other hand, these
contradictions underline the fact that there are serious obstacles to the full
legalization of politics which is, after all, only a strategy necessitated by the
difficulties of advanced capitalism; and not all strategies are successful ones.
Perhaps this one will prove too little, too late. Then again, Canada has been




If Marxism is understood as the science of socialism and socialism as the
radical democratization of social life, we should not have any difficulty in
comprehending the Marxist attitude toward law. For most of its history, law
has been in direct opposition to democracy, and here I am referring not only to
the relatively late appearance of universal suffrage. Law has, for the most
part, in form and in content, enforced and legitimated the very undemocratic
relations of production - the class relations - through institutions which the
public is merely invited to attend (if admission is allowed at all) as spectators
and certainly never as fully equal participants. While there are some
democratic elements in the law worth fighting to preserve (such as those pro-
cedural guarantees celebrated by Thompson) and many democratic legal ideals
worth fighting to achieve (such as a radically egalitarian criminal law in which
both corporate and judicial power are restrained), it must be emphasized that
in our era at least, at a time when class power is not only not diminishing but
rather is consolidating, thriving and expanding (as it has a habit of doing dur-
ing depressions), we are witnessing the reassertion of that old, familiar,
juridical and most undemocratic rule of law. Canada, of course, is completely
within the economic and cultural orbit of the United States which holds the pa-
l19Ibid., at 34, 35.
"
2
See H. Chorney and P. Hansen, "The Falling Rate of Legitimation: The Problem of the Contemporary
Capitalist State in Canada" (1982), 4 Studies In Political Economy 65; and P. Ehrensaft and W. Armstrong,
"The Formation of Dominion Capitalism: Economic Truncation and Class Structure" in G. Drover and A.
Moscovitch (eds.), Inequality: Essays on the Political Economy of Social Welfare (Toronto: University of Toron-
to Press, 1981).
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tent on legalized politics. It would be worth learning whether the phenomenon
is observable in other national contexts. But even if only from our point of
view, that rule of law - the one that is actually resurgent - is best symbol-
ized, not by the blindfolded sword lady, but by that fateful day in March 1984
when an American B-52 bomber, cruise missiles strapped under its wings,
circled diplomatically at the edge of Canadian airspace, waiting for a Federal
Court judge to wave it in with a copy of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms in hand, to do what Canadians mostly opposed. 2 '
12 'On the day before the cruise missile was tested, Operation Dismantle applied for a temporary injunction in the
Federal Court. Judgment was reserved until the next day, but the Court did not open until some time after the
tests were scheduled to begin. It seems that the B-52 pilot was instructed to circle outside Canadian air space until
the decision denying the injunction was actually released. It was only then that the test went ahead.
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